CORTEXA
← Browse
arxivcs.CRcs.AI2026-06-25

Tool Use Enables Undetectable Steganography in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Jimmy Laurence Rippin, Simon C. Marshall, David Demitri Africa, Christian Schroeder de Witt

Increasingly autonomous agentic AI systems pose novel multi-agent risks, such as secret collusion via covert communication channels. The natural defence to these collusion attempts is to monitor plain-text communication, but the efficacy of monitors has been called into doubt by increasingly sophisticated model steganography; indeed, some theoretical schemes have been proposed that are information-theoretically or computationally indistinguishable from good-faith plain-text communication. In this paper, we demonstrate that the complexity of these schemes is no longer a safety barrier, as agentic coding models can already produce undetectable stegosystems when given realistic tool usage, such as code execution or accessing research papers through web searches. Agents also adapt when key ingredients are missing, for example, by adding model-sampling components or implementing related keyed coding schemes. We then frame tacit steganographic coordination between agents as a Schelling-point problem and introduce coordination metrics for estimating when two agents are likely to select compatible schemes without explicit prior agreement. Our results suggest a shift in the threat model for covert communication between AI agents, where the main barrier is no longer whether frontier agents can understand and implement sophisticated stegosystems, but coordination: whether independently acting agents can converge on compatible schemes, keys, and parameters. We find substantial convergence on broad scheme families but limited strict one-shot coordination, suggesting that shared artefacts, repeated interaction, and tool-mediated search are the settings where covert communication risks are most acute. Overall, our findings provide empirical grounding for the recent strategic confinement hypothesis, which assumes that capable agents can construct covert channels that survive monitoring.

View free PDFSource page

Related papers

arxivcs.AIcs.CRcs.MA2026-07-08

Operational Reframing and Approval-Framed Delegation in Multi-Agent LLM Safety

Lifei Liu, Haoran Yu, Xiaochong Jiang, Su Wang, Pin Qian, Yihang Chen

Safety evaluations of multi-agent LLM systems often compare a direct prompt with a planner-executor pipeline and report the difference as a single "pipeline effect." We argue that this aggregate is difficult to interpret because it conflates three mechanisms: harmful intent may b…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.CRcs.AIcs.IRcs.LGcs.MA2026-07-08

Who Broke the System? Failure Localization in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems

Yufei Xia, Anjun Gao, Yueyang Quan, Zhuqing Liu, Minghong Fang

Large language model (LLM) based multi-agent systems enable complex problem solving through coordinated reasoning and action, but their distributed structure also introduces new challenges in diagnosing system-level failures. When an execution fails, identifying which agent is re…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.CRcs.AIcs.MA2026-07-20

ChannelGuard: Safe Models Do Not Compose into Safe Multi-Agent Systems

Elias Hossain, Md Mehedi Hasan Nipu, Fatema Tuj Johora Faria, Tasfia Nuzhat Ornee, Maleeha Sheikh

Multi-agent LLM applications chain a planner, worker agents, a verifier, and a synthesizer, and every hop between agents is an unmonitored channel through which an adversary can smuggle instructions. Existing defenses guard only the input boundary (IBProtector, Llama Guard, perpl…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.AIcs.CR2026-07-08

Reason Less, Verify More: Deterministic Gates Recover a Silent Policy-Violation Failure Mode in Tool-Using LLM Agents

Vikas Reddy, Sumanth Reddy Challaram, Abhishek Basu

Tool-using LLM agents can violate the very policies they are deployed to enforce while appearing to complete the task successfully. In policy-permissive environments, a tool may execute any well-formed call even when the corresponding state transition is forbidden by domain polic…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.CRcs.AIcs.LG2026-07-20

Adaptive Adversaries: A Multi-Turn, Multi-LLM Benchmark for LLM Agent Security

Devina Jain, David Hartmann, Chuan Li

LLM-based agents process external content, exposing them to prompt injection and multi-turn manipulation. Most safety benchmarks evaluate defenders against fixed attack pools collected before evaluation, single-turn or multi-turn. We present a 21-scenario benchmark for \emph{adap…

View free PDFSource page
arxivcs.CRcs.AI2026-07-07

When Agents Go Rogue: Activation-Based Detection of Malicious Behaviors in Multi-Agent Systems

Haowen Xu, Xue Tan, Lei Ma, Zhihao Zhang, Chao Wang, Qingze Wang, et al.

While enabling effective collaboration on complex tasks, LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) face critical security challenges due to vulnerabilities at the agent and interaction levels. Most existing MAS security defenses are built upon two core assumptions: semantically-explici…

View free PDFSource page