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arxivcs.CRcs.AI2026-06-29

A Multi-task Mixture of Experts Framework for Malware Classification, Packing Detection, and Family Attribution

Jithin S., Roshin Sleeba C., Anvin Mariya P. B., Asmitha K. A., Vinod P., Serena Nicolazzo, Antonino Nocera

Malware classification remains a challenging problem due to its inherent heterogeneity, the presence of packed binaries, and the diverse distribution of malware families. Traditional single-model detection mechanisms often fail to generalize across such diverse data, leading to degraded performance, particularly on obfuscated and rare malware samples. In this work, we propose a unified multi-task malware analysis framework based on Mixture of Experts (MoE) architectures. The proposed system evaluates performance across two different input representations, i.e., high-dimensional EMBER feature sets and raw 1D byte arrays extracted from Portable Executable files. It simultaneously performs three critical tasks: malware family classification, packed versus unpacked detection, and malware versus benign identification. By decomposing the problem into specialized expert networks and employing adaptive gating mechanisms, the model enables effective task-specific learning while maintaining overall scalability. We investigate multiple architectural variants, including Homogeneous MoE, Heterogeneous MoE, and Multi-Gate MoE (MMoE). Performance is evaluated in both standard and adversarial settings using original and mutated samples. The obtained results demonstrate that the Multi-Gate MoE model achieves the best performance, reaching a combined detection rate of 0.9744 with only $2.56\%$ failure rate. Moreover, this configuration exhibits improved robustness under mutation-induced distribution shifts. Our findings highlight the effectiveness of expert specialization and task-specific routing in handling complex malware distributions, making the proposed framework a promising direction for scalable and resilient malware detection systems.

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