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arxivcs.CLcs.CRcs.LG2026-07-02

HaloGuard 1.0: An Open Weights Constitutional Classifier for Multilingual AI Safety

Navaneeth Sangameswaran, Preetham S, Ashmiya Lenin

We present HaloGuard 1.0, an open-weights implementation of the constitutional-classifier paradigm for input safety. It achieves state-of-the-art performance on English and multilingual prompt-safety benchmarks at roughly one-tenth the model size of current leading open guard models. The safety constitution is the organising structure of the corpus: a natural-language constitution of 46 policies and 2,940 subcategories drives synthetic data generation, with exhaustive one-to-one paired counterfactuals that hold topic and vocabulary fixed while flipping intent, a two-tier harmless design that separately targets boundary and baseline false positives (FPs), and balanced multilingual materialisation across 46 languages that treats language as a surface form appearing on both sides of the boundary rather than as an adversarial signal. Across seven prompt-safety benchmarks, HaloGuard 1.0-0.8B attains the best average F1 (90.9) of any open guard we evaluate, outperforming baselines up to 27B parameters (over 30 times larger) while holding false-positive rate (FPR) to 4.3 and false-negative rate (FNR) to 9.5. The HaloGuard 1.0-4B variant reaches average F1 of 92.1 and FPR of 3.5, spending its extra capacity on precision rather than recall. A structured adjudication of the remaining failures indicates that most apparent missed-harm cases are benchmark mislabels rather than genuine model misses. An always-on adversarial red-teaming protocol continuously hardens the guard against both content-level and agentic attacks. We release the models as open weights.

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